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We extend the standard voting model to give voters political control
beyond the elections. This gives rise to a new restriction into our po-
litical economy model: policies should not give rise to a revolution.
Our model clarifies when resource discoveries might lead to revolu-
tions, namely, in countries with weak institutions. Natural resources
may be bad for democracy by harming political turnover. Our model
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1 Introduction
Until world war II the economic profession tended to believe that natural
resources were an unqualified blessing for the nation owning them. However,
in the post world-war II period the evidence against this belief started ac-
cumulating: many resource rich countries grew very slowly and economists
started to talk about the curse of natural resources. There is a large number
of empirical papers which find evidence of this curse (e.g. Sachs and Warner
(1995, 1997, 1999, 2001), Mehlum et al. (2006), Gylafson (2004), Strauss
(2000)). Some authors (Sala-i-Martin (1997) and Doppelhofer et al. (2000))
have even classified natural resources as one of the ten most robust variables
with a significantly negative effect on growth in empirical studies.
To summarize, there seems to be an empirical consensus on the following:
Fact 1 The curse of natural resources: countries rich in natural resources
grow slower on average than natural resource poor countries.
However, there are many important outliers. Some resource rich countries
have grown very fast (e.g. Botswana,1 Canada, Australia Norway) while
others have grown very slowly (e.g. Nigeria, Zambia, Sierra Leone, Angola,
Saudi Arabia, Venezuela).2 It seems fair to claim that:
Fact 2 The cross-country evidence is inconsistent with a monotonic effect
of resources on development/growth: (Robinson et al. (2005))
We therefore need to understand when are natural resources a blessing
and when are they a curse. The empirical literature has taken a step in this
direction and it defines policy failure as the prime cause of the underperfor-
mance of resource rich countries. It also points to a reason why these policy
failures occur. Namely:
1Acemoglu et al. (2003) show that Botswana has the highest per capita growth of any
country in the world in the last 35 years. The natural resource of Botswana are diamonds.
This country had very bad starting conditions for growth (extremely low education levels,
bad infrastructure, etc) but “good” institutions.
2Some countries which have been fairly rich in resources in 1970 that grew rapidly in
the next 20 years are Malaysia, Mauritius and Iceland (see Sachs and Warner (2001)).
Gylafson (2001a) additionally lists Indonesia and Thailand as countries attaining both
long-term investment exceeding 25% GDP and per capita GNP growth exceeding 4% per
year on average from 1970 to 1998. Also the so-called Scandinavian catch-up in the late
nineteenth century was based on natural resources.
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Fact 3 The quality of institutions is decisive in determining whether natural
resources are a blessing or a curse.3
Institutions are linked to the behavior of politicians, as they limit their
discretion and define the policy space. The quality of institutions is also
indicative of the level of democracy of a country. More democratic countries
tend to have better institutions and are therefore less likely to be cursed by
natural resources. But empirical findings also suggest a reverse causality:
Fact 4 Natural resources have antidemocratic properties: oil and mineral
wealth tends to make states less democratic (Ross, 2001, Lam and Wantchekon,
2002)4
Moreover, in countries with weak institutions natural resources are one
of the main sources of civil war and revolution.
Fact 5 Many revolutions are linked to rents derived from natural resources
(Collier and Hoeﬄer, 1998).
The contribution of the present paper is threefold:
1. We propose the first theoretical model that incorporates and explains
the five empirical facts outlined above.
2. We present an explicitly political model which emphasizes the behavior
and incentives of politicians. This is key, since there is a clear under-
standing that the behavior of government/politicians is fundamental
to explain the economic performance in resource abundant countries
(Newberry (1986, p.334)).
3. We extend the standard voting model to give voters political control
beyond the elections. Democratic institutions are often imperfect, and
electoral competition could be weak. But in our model, as in reality,
citizens have instruments in addition to elections that allow them to
3Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006) show that the effect of resources on growth is
positive (negative) when institutions are good (bad) using Sachs and Warner’s (1995)
data. The same paper as well as Boschini, Petterson and Roine (2003) show that the
direct negative effect is stronger for minerals than other resources and institutions are
more decisive for the effect of minerals than other resources.
4This is also known as the political Dutch disease.
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avoid policies which could cause them big welfare losses. We introduce
these considerations in the model by assuming that citizens can initiate
a revolution.5 This gives rise to a new restriction into our political
economy model: policies should not give rise to a revolution. We will
refer to this new constraint as the no-revolution constraint.
The existing theoretical literature concentrates mainly on explaining the
“curse” (Fact 1)6,7 and suggests ways to avoid the curse.8 By ignoring the
role of the government, this line of research cannot explain why governments
do not choose the good policies in the first place.9 We need an explicitly
political models to understand when natural resources are a blessing and
when they are a curse.
To our knowledge the only existing explicitly political model in this area is
Robinson et al. (2005), which explains empirical facts 2 and 3. In their paper
there are two periods, with elections at the end of the first period. In the first
period, natural resources are discovered. The incumbent government has to
decide which proportion of the resources to extract then, and how much to
leave for the following period. The government can consume the resource
income, or use it to influence election outcomes by offering employment in
the public sector, which is relatively inefficient. The main result of the paper
is that politicians tend to overextract resources in the first period because
they only care about the future resources if they remain in power. Moreover,
5It need not be violent, although we will assume it causes some economic disruption.
6For a list of explanations for the natural resource trap and their empirical support see
Strauss (2000).
7There is no generally accepted explanation for the curse so far. The one with maybe
most empirical support is the “Dutch disease” explanation which goes as follows: the
discovery and exploitations of natural resources like oil typically leads to large profits.
These profits encourage entry into the industry at the expense of other sectors, expand
national income and increase demand with a resulting inflationary pressure. At the same
time more foreign currency enters the country which appreciates the real exchange rate.
Export profits in the non-boom sector fall sharply which attracts even more capacity
into the boom sector. The long-run results once the boom is over are stagflation and an
over-valued real exchange rate.
The Dutch disease is preventable by good policies; e.g. Indonesia avoided the disease
after its oil discovery by consistently devaluating its currency.
8See e.g. Birdsall et al. (2000).
9Rent-seeking and corruption are explanations that have been put forward. In these
models the state is an aggregator of pressure from interest groups (Becker-Olson approach)
which as Robinson et al. (2005) pointed out ignores incentives of politicians who often
have a large amount of autonomy from interest groups.
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the public sector will be inefficiently large. Institutions are decisive for the
overall impact of resource booms because they determine the extent to which
political incentives can really influence policy outcomes.
While the size of the public sector and the extraction path of natural
resources are clearly relevant issues, there are other important channels from
natural resources to growth that are unexplored by Robinson et al. (2005). In
particular, human capital accumulation or education. One danger of natural
resources (Gylafson (2001a)) is the neglect of education, since the country can
live well over an extended period even with a weak commitment to education.
But since we know that increased education is conducive to higher growth
levels (Barro (2001), Barro and Lee (2001), Gylfason and Zoega (2004)),
this reduced commitment to education will surely cost those countries in
terms of long-run growth. For this reason, it is difficult to explain the higher
persistence of growth in resource-rich Scandinavia than in Latin America
(especially resource-rich countries such as Argentina and Chile) without re-
marking on the educational gap that emerged between the two groups of
countries over the period 1870-1910 and which remained large throughout
the twentieth century (see Bravo-Ortega et al. (2002)).
In this paper we build an explicitly political model to explain when will
the finding of natural resources lead to higher or lower education levels. We
are only interested in publicly owned resources, such as oil, gas and min-
erals.10 Politicians are purely self-interested and would like to consume the
resource wealth themselves, but political pressure obliges them to redistribute
at least a part of it to voters. This redistribution can be take the form of: (i)
a direct transfer or (ii) a subsidy for the investment in human capital, which
has a positive spillover on the entire population. The incumbent government
faces political pressure from two sources: an election and the possibility of a
revolution. We model political opposition by the existence of a competitive
fringe. The fringe parties compete among themselves and are less efficient
than the government at managing natural resources. The underlying idea is
that the party in power has access to better information or technologies which
are denied to the opposition.11 The bigger this difference, the less transparent
are the country’s institutions and the less democratic is the country. Hence
10In all petrostates the government maintains explicit legal ownership of below-ground
reserves irrespective of surface property rights (see footnote 12 in Lam and Wantchekon
(2002)). Most OPEC governments put the resources under national control in particular
in the 60s and 70s.
11E.g. control of the media.
5
the size of the disadvantage of the fringe gives us a measure for the level of
democracy. While there will be always some gap, human capital can reduce
the comparative disadvantage of the fringe.
Besides the political competition there is always a possibility of a rev-
olution. If the revolution is successful, natural resources fall into the hand
of the voters who divide the gains equally among themselves. These gains
now depend on the management skills of voters. We assume that voters are
better at managing natural resources the higher their level of education.
We establish the following main results:
1. If the fringe wins the election, human capital increases with the size of
the stock of natural resources.
2. If the government wins the election, human capital is a non-increasing
function of natural resources.
3. If the government does not have to worry about revolution, human
capital is constant.
4. If revolution is a binding constraint, human capital decreases in natural
resources.
5. Revolution is less likely to be a threat, the more democratic are a
country’s institution.
6. The probability that the incumbent is reelected may increase with nat-
ural resources and this is more likely for countries with little democracy.
These results confirm that our explicitly political model captures the
five empirical facts mentioned above. Our model clarifies when resource
discoveries might lead to revolutions (Fact 5), namely, in countries with weak
institutions. In our model, natural resources may be bad for democracy
because they can harm political turnover (Fact 4). Our model suggests a non-
linear dependence of human capital on natural resources (Fact 2). For low
levels of democracy human capital depends negatively on natural resources,
while for high levels of democracy the dependence is reversed (Fact 3). Since
natural resources are bad when the government wins the election, and this
probability may increase with natural resources, especially in countries with
bad institutions, natural resources are a curse on average (Fact 1).
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Empirical facts 1 to 3 were stated in terms of growth. We do not model
growth directly, but use human capital/education instead, which is an estab-
lished engine of growth (Barro 2001). Hence, our model yields direct pre-
dictions for the effect of natural resources on education (as well as indirect
predictions on growth). These direct predictions can be tested empirically.
Existing empirical studies report conflicting results of the effect of natural re-
sources on education.12 The most complete study is the one by Stijns (2004),
who discusses the different indicators used for resource abundance and hu-
man capital accumulation and shows that the conclusion on the link between
these two is sensitive to the indicators chosen. Simple correlation coefficients
and regressions switch from positive to negative depending on which resource
abundance and which human capital indicator is used. This evidence might
be consistent with the non-linear dependence of human capital on natural re-
sources predicted in our model. This, however, has to be tested by including
a variable that measures the level of democracy or the quality of institutions
of a country in the regressions. There does not exist such an empirical study.
We therefore run our own regressions (cross section and panel data) which
confirm that the non-linear relationship is indeed driven by the democracy
variable.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the model and solves it. Section 3 test the model empirically. Section 4
concludes.
2 The Model
Assume a country owns a stock of natural resources whose rents generate a
discounted present value W . These resources are publicly owned and will
therefore be managed by politicians. Politicians are motivated solely by self-
interest, hence the government would like to keep the gains from the resources
for itself, but it will only be able to benefit from the resource discovery if
it remains in power. There are two potential threats for the government’s
power: an upcoming election and the possibility of a revolution. First the
election takes place. Once the election outcome is known, voters still have
12Gylfason (2001a, 2004) establishes an inverse relationship of human capital mea-
sured as public expenditure on education, expected years of schooling for girls and gross
secondary-school enrollment with the share of natural capital in national wealth. However,
the results seem to be driven by very few countries.
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the possibility to make a revolution. We first describe the electoral process.
In the elections, the government G faces the opposition of a competitive
fringe. In other words, the opposition consists of several parties that compete
among themselves. The unique policy issue is how to distribute the rents
generated by the natural resource. We assume that the value of resources
depends on the winner of the elections: its value will beW if managed by the
incumbent government and δ(e)W if managed by one of the fringe parties,
where 0 < δ(e) < 1 for all e, indicates that the fringe is at a comparative
disadvantage in managing natural resources. We assume that δ′(e) > 0, i.e.
the competence of the fringe increases with human capital. The function δ(e)
is a proxy for the strength of democracy. The more democratic the state, the
better is the fringe at managing natural resources.
There are two ways to transfer resource rents to voters, (i) via a direct
(per capita) transfer w and (ii) via a per unit subsidy pi for the investment
in human capital. The individual’s level of human capital e together with
the average level of human capital e determines each individual’s marginal
productivity (salary) ω in the following way (where we assume α+ β < 1):
ω = keαeβ
Hence there is a positive externality (spillover) for society as a whole if an
individual invests in human capital. We assume that the monetary cost of
acquiring a unit of human capital is λ. Given the promised transfers, the
voter decides on his own level of human capital by maximizing his utility.
Hence, the program of the consumer is˙
max
e
U(w + keαeβ − (λ− pi)e)
The FOC of this (concave) problem give λ − pi = αkeα−1eβ. Since all con-
sumers are identical we can assume that in equilibrium e = e. Therefore the
consumer’s incentive compatibility constraint can be written as
λ− pi = αkeα+β−1 (1)
and, using this constraint, we can talk directly about the level of human
capital e resulting from the transfers instead of discussing the size of the
subsidy pi.
There is a continuum of voters with total mass n. Voters care about the
promised utility by the competing parties but also have some ideological con-
cerns. The fringe parties are perceived by voters as ideologically equivalent,
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hence we can assume that the equilibrium behavior of fringe players will be
identical (we focus on a symmetric equilibrium). From now on, all endoge-
nous variables will be indexed by the political actor offering them. Thus, we
have ωi, wi, ei, ei, pii with i ∈ {G,F} where G stands for “Government” and
F for “Fringe”.
The electoral process is a version of the probabilistic voting model and
works in the following way:
Voters are located in the interval [0, 1]. The utility of a voter v ∈ [0, 1]
when offered a policy that delivers “material” utility UG from the government
is denoted
u(v, UG) = UG − θv
The utility of a voter v ∈ [0, 1] when offered a policy that delivers “material”
utility UF from the competitive fringe is denoted
u(v, UF ) = UF − θ(1− v)
where θ denotes the strength of purely ideological concerns.
In addition, in every election there is an unexpected “aggregate shock”
ε ∼ U [−A,A] to the utility that shifts preferences of all the voters in favor
or against the incumbent. We add this shock to the preferences toward the
incumbent.
u(v, UG) + ε
The proportion of voters preferring G over F is then:
min
{
max
{
0,
1
2
+
UG − UF
2θ
+
ε
2θ
}
, 1
}
Thus, the ex ante probability that the incumbent wins the election, given
promises UF , UG is:
Pr
[
min
{
max
{
0,
1
2
+
UG − UF
2θ
+
ε
2θ
}
, 1
}
≥ 1
2
]
.
Hence, the incumbent wins for all ε > ε1 where ε1 makes
1
2
+ UG−UF
2θ
+ ε1
2θ
=
1
2
. Thus, ε1 = −(UG − UF ). The probability of winning for the incumbent is
equal to
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Pr [ε > ε1 = −(UG − UF )] = min
{
max
{
0,
A− ε1
2A
}
, 1
}
(2)
= min
{
max
{
0,
1
2
+
UG − UF
2A
}
, 1
}
.
The incumbent cannot win if 1
2
+ UG−UF
2A
< 0 which implies that A <
−(UG − UF ). On the other hand, the incumbent wins with probability 1 for
A < (UG − UF ).
After the election results, the citizens decide whether or not to make a
revolution.13 Hence, if a revolution takes place, this happens after the acqui-
sition of human capital. We assume that a revolution is costly (its marginal
cost is c) and it is successful with probability q. In case of a successful revolu-
tion, the citizens manage directly the natural resources and obtain an equal
split of these resources. Just like with the fringe politicians, the natural
resources that go to the citizens after the revolution increases with human
capital. We model this by assuming that the natural resources that go to
citizens after a successful revolution is γ(e)W
n
with γ′(e) > 0. If the revo-
lution fails, the original contract proposed by the winner of the elections is
imposed.
We now make a first observation on this game, that will useful for the
discussion.
Lemma 6 Revolution is a potential threat only to the incumbent government
Proof. First notice that competition among the fringe players drives
their profits down to zero. The equilibrium offer by the fringe can thus
be obtained by maximizing the consumers’ utility subject to the resource
constraint (what we call the fringe program). To see why the fringe never
takes the no-revolution constraint into account, suppose that the solution to
the above described fringe program (call it program 1) does not satisfy the
no-revolution constraint (which would be the only problematic case). Then
one could obtain an alternative solution by imposing the constraint (call this
13We think of a revolution as a threshold public good problem. At least x people have
to go, or the revolution will not take place. This modeling choice leaves unanswered the
question of who does the revolution. In our model there is a natural candidate: the group
of voters ideologically most distinct from the winning party.
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the solution to program 2). But the solution to program 2 can only decrease
the utility of agents (with respect to the solution of program 1), which can
only worsen the constraint, hence we would entail a contradiction.
The government, on the other hand, does keep some of the resource rents
for itself. Therefore revolution might be a threat for the government. The
no-revolution constraint requires the contract offered by the government
to be at least as good as the outcome of the revolution, i.e.14
U(w+keα+β−αkeα+β) ≥ qU(γ(e)W/n−λe)+(1−q)U(w+keα+β−αkeα+β)−c
which simplifies to:
U(w + keα+β − αkeα+β) ≥ U(γ(e)W/n− λe)− c
q
(3)
We are now in the position to state the maximization problems of the
government and of the fringe players.
2.1 The fringe problem
Due to competition among fringe players, the fringe maximizes the con-
sumers’ utility subject to the resource constraint15 :
max
eF ,wF
U(wF + ke
α+β
F − αkeα+βF )
subject to δ(eF )W/n− wF − λeF + αkeα+βF ≥ 0
or equivalently
max
eF ,wF
U
(
δ(eF )W/n− wF − λeF + αkeα+βF + keα+βF − αkeα+βF
)
max
eF
U
(
δ(eF )W/n− λeF + keα+βF
)
14Here we already introduce the incentive compatibility constraint of consumers, equa-
tion 1.
15Profits are really
(
δ(eF )W/n− wF − λeF + αkeα+βF
)
min
{
max
{
0, 12 +
UF−UG
2A
}
, 1
}
,
but notice that min
{
max
{
0, 12 +
UF−UG
2A
}
, 1
}
being a probability is always bigger than
zero, thus it never affects whether the constraint is binding or not.
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So the first order condition is
δ′(eF )W/n+ (α+ β)ke
α+β−1
F − λ = 0 (4)
In this way, we have that
∂eF
∂W/n
=
−δ′(eF )
(α+ β)(α+ β − 1)keα+β−2F + δ′′(eF )W/n
Since we know that if the decision is optimal (α + β)(α + β − 1)keα+β−2F +
δ′′(eF )W/n ≤ 0 (to guarantee the satisfaction of second order conditions),
then if δ′(eF ) ≥ 0, the effect of increasingW in eF is positive. We summarize
this observation in:
Proposition 7 When the fringe wins the election, human capital is posi-
tively related to the amount of natural resources.
Things look very different if the incumbent government wins the election.
2.2 The government problem
The government maximizes its own utility subject to the no-revolution con-
straint:
max
eG,wG
(
W/n− wG − λeG + αkeα+βG
)
×min
{
max
{
0,
1
2
+
U(wG + ke
α+β
G − αkeα+βG )− UF
2A
}
, 1
}
subject to U(wG + ke
α+β
G − αkeα+βG ) ≥ U(γ(eG)W/n− λeG)−
c
q
In order to derive some analytical solutions, we further assume that
U(x) = ln(x). Then
max
eG,wG
(
W/n− wG − λeG + αkeα+βG
)
×min
{
max
{
0,
1
2
+
ln(wG + ke
α+β
G − αkeα+βG )− UF
2A
}
, 1
}
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subject to wG + ke
α+β
G − αkeα+βG ≥ (γ(eG)W/n− λeG) exp
(
−c
q
)
We have to distinguish two cases: (i) the no-revolution constraint binds
at the optimum and (ii) the no-revolution constraint does not bind at the
optimum.
Case (i) We have:
max
eG,wG
W/n
(
1− γ(eG) exp
(
−c
q
))
+ keα+βG
−λeG
(
1− exp
(
−c
q
))
×min
max
0, 12 + ln
(
W/n
(
1− γ(eG) exp
(
− c
q
)))
− UF
2A
 , 1

The FOC are
G′(eG) ≡ −W/n
[(
γ′(eG) exp
(
−c
q
))
+ k(α+ β)eα+β−1G − λ
(
1− exp
(
−c
q
))]
1
2
+
U
(
W/n
(
1− γ(eG) exp
(
− c
q
)))
− UF
2A

+
 −
(
γ′(eG) exp
(
− c
q
))
2A
(
1− γ(eG) exp
(
− c
q
))
W/n
[(
1− γ(eG) exp
(
−c
q
))
+ keα+βG − λeG
(
1− exp
(
−c
q
))]
= 0
which implies that
13
∂eG
∂W/n
=
γ′(eG) exp
(
− c
q
)(
1
2
+
U(W/n(1−γ(eG) exp(− cq )))−UF
2A
)
G′′(eG)
+[(
1− γ(eG) exp
(
− c
q
))
+ keα+βG − λeG
(
1− exp
(
− c
q
))](
(γ′(eG) exp(− cq ))
2A(1−γ(eG) exp(− cq ))
)
G′′(eG)
We know that:
1. G′′(eG) ≤ 0 to guarantee the satisfaction of second order conditions.
2.
(
1
2
+
U(W/n(1−γ(eG) exp(− cq )))−UF
2A
)
≥ 0, since it is a probability,
3.
[(
1− γ(eG) exp
(
− c
q
))
+ keα+βG − λeG
(
1− exp
(
− c
q
))]
≥ 0, as those
are the profits of the incumbent if she wins the elections
Thus, if γ′(eG) ≥ 0, the effect of increasing W in eG is negative.16
Case (ii) If the constraint does not bind (true for sufficiently low values of
exp
(
− c
q
)
), we have:
max
eG,wG
(
W/n− wG − λeG + αkeα+βG
)
×min
{
max
{
0,
1
2
+
ln(wG + ke
α+β
G − αkeα+βG )− UF
2A
}
, 1
}
16When calculating the first order conditions we implicitly assume that 12 +
UG−UF
A < 1.
If the expression becomes bigger than 1, the government wins the elections for sure. In
this case it only has to take the no-revolution constraint into account. We show in the
Appendix that also in this case increasing natural resources has a negative effect on human
capital.
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and the FOCs are:
0 = −
(
1
2
+
ln(wG + ke
α+β
G − αkeα+βG )− UF
2A
)
+
(
W/n− wG − λeG + αkeα+βG
)( 1
2A(wG + ke
α+β
G − αkeα+βG )
)
0 =
(
−λ+ αk(α+ β)eα+β−1G
)(1
2
+
ln(wG + ke
α+β
G − αkeα+βG )− UF
2A
)
+
(
W/n− wG − λeG + αkeα+βG
)( k(1− α)(α+ β)eα+β−1G
2A(wG + ke
α+β
G − αkeα+βG )
)
Thus
k(α+ β)eα+β−1G = λ⇔ eG =
(
k(α+ β)
λ
)1−α−β
(5)
In this case human capital is independent of the amount of natural resources.
We summarize these remarks in the following proposition.
Proposition 8 If the government wins the election, human capital is a non-
increasing function of natural resources. If revolution is no threat, human
capital does not depend on natural resources. If revolution is a threat, human
capital decreases with natural resources.
2.2.1 When does the government worry about revolution?
One thing that remains unclear in the previous exposition is the conditions
under which the no-revolution constraint is binding. We now explore this
issue.
Rewriting the FOCs for case (ii) (the one where the constraint is not
binding) allows us to calculate wG.
0 = −
(
1
2
+
ln(wG + k(1− α)eα+βG )− UF
2A
)
+
W/n− wG − kβeα+βG
2A(wG + k(1− α)eα+βG ))
The solution is:{
wG = exp
(
LambertW
((
W/n+ (1− (α+ β))keα+βG
)
expA−UF−1
)
− A+ UF + 1
)
−k(1− α)eα+βG
}
(6)
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The salary wG we obtained assuming the no-revolution constraint is not
binding satisfies that constraint when the following inequality is true.
wG ≥ (γ(eG)W/n−k(α+β)eα+βG ) exp
(
−c
q
)
−k(1−α)eα+βG ≡ NR(eG) (7)
To get some insight when revolution is a concern for the government, we per-
form some numerical simulations, using condition (7). In those simulations
we will always vary the value of W/n and some other exogenous variable
simultaneously. Similarly, the figures we show depict the value of wG and of
NR(eG), as a function ofW/n and some other exogenous variable. We group
these other exogenous variables into four categories depending on their eco-
nomic meaning. For the simulations we use the functions17 γ(e) = 10−4+ e2,
and δ(e) = δ̂eα+β and the basic parameters, which are then varied indi-
vidually (along with W/n) to observe the different comparative statics are:
(α, β, δ̂, λ, A, c/q, k) = (0.5, 0.2, 0.15, 1, 1, 1, 10).
1. The variables c
q
and γ(eG) determine the strength of the threat of rev-
olution. The larger is this threat, the more likely is the no-revolution
constraint to bind. In other words, as the citizens become better at
managing natural resources (high γ(eG) for all eG), the no-revolution
constraint becomes more relevant. Similarly, for low values of c
q
(the
cost of revolution is low and/or the probability of success is high) the
no-revolution constraint will always bind. When c
q
increases, low val-
ues of W/n give rise to the unconstrained solution while the constraint
binds for high values ofW/n. Given that revolution is already costly, it
is only worthwhile if there is a lot to gain (high W/n). For sufficiently
high c
q
revolution is never an issue; it is simply too costly or too unlikely
to be successful.
Figure 1 shows the impact of c
q
on both wG and of NR(eG) and illus-
trates graphically the previous discussion.
2. The variables k, λ, α and β determine the returns and costs of invest-
ment in human capital.
17We tried other functional forms, in particular δ(e) = δ̂, and the qualitative results in
terms of comparative statics are similar.
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(a) The effect of a change in k, which increases (linearly) the marginal
return to human capital, depends crucially on the function γ(e).
An increase in k, leads to higher e and thus an increase in γ(e).
Both the unconstrained transfer wG and NR(eG) increase with
k (and with W/n). Whether or not the latter increases more
strongly, depends on γ(e).
i. For low γ(e), the no-revolution constraint never binds. Citi-
zens are simply too bad in managing natural resources.
ii. Suppose γ(e) is sufficiently large. Then, if k or W/n are suf-
ficiently low, the no-revolution constraint never binds. How-
ever, if both k and W/n are sufficiently high, the constraing
binds. The reason for this is that the average slope of NR(eG)
with respect to both k and W/n is higher than that of wG. To
understand this, notice that on the right hand side of equa-
tion (7) we have the term γ(eG)W/n. This means that the
human capital of the government eG, and natural resources
W/n are complements in the technology for revolutions, so a
simultaneous increase of k, and thus eG, and W/n are bound
to have a higher effect on the possibility of revolutions than
on wG.
Figure 2 shows the impact of k on both wG and of NR(eG)
and illustrates graphically the previous discussion.
(b) The parameter λ measures the individual’s marginal cost to ac-
quire human capital. The effects of changing λ are, thus, the re-
verse effects of changing k (which, remember, is a proportionality
constant on human capital returns). More precisely:
i. For low γ(e) the no-revolution constraint never binds.
ii. If γ(e) is sufficiently large, the no-revolution constraint binds
when both λ and W/n are sufficiently low and does not bind
if either λ or W/n are sufficiently high.
Figure 3 shows the impact of λ on both wG and of NR(eG).
(c) The parameters α and β determine the returns to scale of human
capital. We assume α + β < 1, hence returns to scale will always
be decreasing. Since both parameters have the same qualitative
effect, we will describe only the effects of α. For low α, the no-
revolution constraint always binds except for very high values of
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W/n. When α increases, the fraction of values of W/n in which
the unconstrained solution holds increases, until α is so high that
only the unconstrained solution holds. The intuition is as follows:
returns to human capital are not relevant when revolution is suc-
cessful since there is no productive activity of workers in case of
revolution. Hence, the revolution is more attractive for low values
of α. When α increases, it is more costly to forgo the returns from
productive activity, and revolution will only be attractive if there
are sufficient natural resources to be managed. For high enough
α, it is simply too costly not to engage in the productive activity,
hence revolution is never an issue.
Figure 4 shows the impact of α on both wG and of NR(eG) and
illustrates graphically the previous discussion.
3. The function δ(e) is a measure of democracy. The closer this function
is to 1 for all e, the better are the democratic institutions. Better
democratic institutions allows the fringe to offer a higher utility UF to
voters. Hence, the government has to react with a higher direct transfer
wG which implies that the no-revolution constraint will bind less often.
In other words, with good democratic institutions, revolution will not
occur.
4. The aggregate shock A to voters’ preferences measures the extent to
which policies matter for winning the elections. The bigger the shock,
the less important are the promised utilities to voter. For very low
A, we always have the unconstrained solution. When A increases, the
constraint soon bites and we only get the unconstrained solution for
low W/n. The higher A, the smaller the fraction of value for which the
unconstrained solution holds. This happens because wG decreases with
A, since promised utilities have a smaller effect on the probability of
winning the elections, while NR(eG) is independent of A.
Figure 5 shows the impact of A on both wG and of NR(eG) and illus-
trates graphically the previous discussion.
2.3 Determining the winner of the elections
The probability that the government wins the election is directly related to
UG−UF . To gain some insight we will discuss the case when the no-revolution
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constraint does not bind. From (6) we can conclude that
UG − UF = LambertW
((
W/n+ (1− (α+ β))keα+βG
)
expA−UF−1
)
− A+ 1
Since the LambertW function is increasing we only have to look at the
derivative of its argument. Thus we have
sign
∂ (UG − UF )
∂ (W/n)
= sign
(
expA−UF−1
(
1−
(
W/n+ (1− (α+ β))keα+βG
) ∂UF
∂W/n
))
= sign
(
1− (W/n+ (1− (α+ β))ke
α+β
G )δ(eF )
δ(eF )W/n− λeF + keα+βF
)
(8)
Whether this sign is positive or negative, hence whether the probability
that the government wins the election is increasing or decreasing is generally
going to depend on the parameters of the model. However, a couple of things
can be deduced from this expression. For W/n = 0 we know from equation
(4) that
eF =
(
(α+β)k
λ
) 1
1−α−β
Clearly, if (α+β)k
λ
is low enough, (8) is positive. On the other hand, for
very largeW/n when the variation of eF is smaller than that ofW/n then (8)
will asymptote to zero. From this argument it is not clear whether it could
ever be decreasing. To confirm that in fact it can, we perform a numerical
simulation using the same basic parameter values and functional forms as
in subsection 2.2.1. The result of this simulation is shown in Figure 6. The
figure displays the two features we uncovered analytically and also shows
that for sufficiently high W/n the sign is negative.
The fact that the derivative can be both positive and negative reflects that
two economic forces are at work. On the one hand, as resources increase, the
government can pay higher direct transfers wG, thus increasing its chances of
winning. On the other hand, the fringe can also offer better terms, especially
through the channel of human capital eF , which also enhances its probability
of winning and makes the fringe a better administrator of natural resources.
The concavity of the effort function makes it more likely that the first effect
dominates in the beginning. The effect of direct transfers hits the margin
directly from the beginning, whereas the effect of human capital needs more
natural resources to have the same marginal impact.
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Clearly, by bounding the δ(e) function one could ensure that (8) is never
negative, which seems to be the relevant case according to the empirical evi-
dence. Recall that we interpreted the δ(e) function as a proxy for the strength
of democracy. δ(e) low and bounded corresponds to a country where demo-
cratic institutions are weak and the Fringe cannot manage natural resources
as efficiently as the government even for high levels of education. In this
case, any natural resource finding increases the chances of the incumbent
government to stay in power. Only strong democracies make it less likely
that natural resources will allow the incumbent to become more entrenched.
3 Empirical evidence
In order to test empirically our theory we have conducted some regressions
on available data. We first report a cross section regression of primary school
enrollment (human capital) on a measure of natural capital share (naturalk),
a measure of political rights (polriginv), the cross product of both variables
(cross) and additional controls. Natural capital is taken from Gylfason and
Zoega (2004) who constructed this measure from World Bank Data. Natural
capital is the sum of “subsoil wealth”, timber, non-timber benefits of forests,
cropland, pasture land, and the opportunity cost of protected areas. In turn,
subsoil wealth is the present value of a constant stream of economic profits
on “resource rents” on various fuels and minerals; that is, gross profit on
extraction less depreciation of capital and normal return on capital. The
political rights variable is the inverse of the Gastil Index of Political Rights
constructed by the Freedom House.18 Thus, in our regressions political rights
are measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one representing the lowest degree
of freedom and seven the highest. Political Rights’ data for a specific year
is the previous five years’ average. The source for the data on primary
school enrollment is the World Development Indicators from UNESCO. The
additional controls are taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI)
and are the log of GDP, measures of fertility, mortality and birth rates and
the pupil teacher ratio in primary schools (pupil). Natural capital is available
for 1994. All other variables are typically available every 5 years from 1970
to 1995. In the regression we use per country averages for this period and
only include countries which have at least 3 observations for all variables.
18For a detailed explanation of the index and the methodology see
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=35&year=2005
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This makes 78 countries.
The results are reported in table 1. Most importantly, natural capital
has a negative and significant effect and the cross variable has a positive and
significant effect. This means that the higher the level of democracy, the lower
the negative impact of natural resources. In fact, when the index for political
rights is four or above the net effect is positive. This is consistent with the
predictions of our model. Other controls also make sensible predictions: log
GDP has a positive effect on human capital, fertility and mortality have
negative effects.
Table 1: Cross section regression.
Coeff. Std. Err. t P (|βi| > 0)
naturalk -1.153341 .4238907 -2.72 0.008
cross2 .3395294 .1244045 2.73 0.008
polriginv -7.585228 2.195964 -3.45 0.001
lgdp 3.541507 2.756116 1.28 0.203
fertility -20.29832 5.814107 -3.49 0.001
mortality -.2884667 .0950492 -3.03 0.003
pupil .2558133 .1964023 1.30 0.197
birth 2.493832 .8983785 2.78 0.007
cons 116.8061 24.83554 4.70 0.000
One problem with this regression is its cross-section nature. We have also
done a fixed effects panel data regression. The main difference is that the
variable for natural resources is now a measure of primary export intensity
(exports of primary products divided by GDP, source: WTO). The main
drawback of this variable is that it also includes agricultural products and
not only fuel and mining products. This is the variable used by Sachs and
Warner (1995). All variables are typically available from 1970 to 1995 for a
total of 346 observations for 84 countries. The results (reported in table 2)
are very similar to those of the previous regression. Primary export intensity
(sxpwon) has again a negative and significant effect (at a 10% level) and the
cross variable has a positive and significant effect. Again, when the index for
political rights is four or above the net effect is positive, consistently with
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our model. log GDP still has a positive effect on human capital, fertility and
mortality still have negative effects. Pupil is now significant and positive.19
Table 2: Panel data regression.
Coeff. Std. Err. t P (|βi| > 0)
sxpown -21.15012 12.92005 -1.64 0.103
cross 6.758621 3.141805 2.15 0.032
lgdp 5.355735 3.070228 1.74 0.082
fertility -2.134075 2.241165 -0.95 0.342
mortality -.4958456 .0728834 -6.80 0.000
pupil .4484188 .1273336 3.52 0.001
birth .7433418 .4282405 1.74 0.084
cons 53.89933 25.74006 2.09 0.037
To summarize, the above regressions clearly corroborate our theory: the
quality of institutions and the level of democracy is decisive in determining
whether natural resources are a blessing or a curse. In democratic countries
natural resources enhance education. In non-democratic countries natural
resources are detrimental to education. In both the cross section and the
panel data regression the cutoff value for our index of political rights is 4.
Hence, in all countries clearly classified as free by the Freedom House (which
correspond to our index 5.5 to 7) natural resources are a blessing and are
a curse in all countries the Freedom House classifies as not free (which cor-
respond to our index 1 to 2.5). The turning point lies in the partly free
countries (with an index 3 to 5).
19A further difference of the panel data regression with the cross section regression is
that in the panel data regression (Table 2) we do not include the polriginv variable (our
measure for political rights) directly but only the cross effect with primary export intensity.
We chose to report the regression of Table 2 since the regression with polriginv reveals
that polriginv is not significant (t-value of 0.64) and the cross variable loses significance
(t-value of 1.25) when polriginv is included.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a formal political-economy analysis of the
impact of natural resources on human capital accumulation. In our model,
citizens exert control over politicians via an election and can always initiate
a revolution if they are dissatisfied with the proposed policies. Since it is
a well-documented fact that natural resources have led to civil unrest, it is
important to incorporate this possibility into the model. To our knowledge
this is the first paper to do so.20 We propose to model the possibility of
revolution by introducing a new constraint into the model, which we denote
the no-revolution constraint. Under this constraint politicians select their
policies so that there are no sufficiently large sectors of the population who
want to block this policy by starting a revolution. In the context of nat-
ural resources, this constraint can be taken literally. However, we would
like to emphasize that this constraint might be introduced in many other
models: the economic literature is full of policy recommendations which no
sane politician has dared to implement even if a majority of the population
would benefit from them. This sounds contrary to both economic and polit-
ical theory, but we would argue that there are good practical reasons for the
outcome that the models overlook.
These policy recommendations arise in models where the policy resulting
from the voting mechanism (e.g. the policy preferred by the median voter)
would harm a sizable proportion of the population. Such policies are not
implemented because the sector that would be harmed has pressure instru-
ments on top of their votes to block them, and these pressure instruments
can be modeled by the no-revolution constraint.21 Hence, the importance of
20Introducing revolution in political economy models is not an innovation “per se.”
Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) explain the “extension of the franchise” in precisely this
way. But notice that in their work, revolution is a threat from citizens “excluded” from
the vote, who thus have no alternative. In our work, “revolution” is an added tool for all
citizens, not an alternative when there is not a chance to vote. Acemoglu and Robinson
(2006) do include the possibility of revolting in democracy. However, this possibility does
not operate as a constraint for the government. It is simply a binary choice for the poor
(already the median voter and thus the tax setters in the democracy).
21One example of such a policy recommendation is the abolition of capital taxes. Lucas
(1990) has shown that the optimal capital tax is zero. It has also been shown that the
representative consumer would vote for a capital tax of zero. Even in a model with
heterogeneous agents (Garcia-Mila`, Marcet and Ventura, 2001) the median voter is likely
to vote in favor of abolishing capital taxes. This, however, can harm as much as a third of
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our proposed modeling innovation lies far beyond the topic studied.
In terms of the topic we study, our contribution is to incorporate si-
multaneously the five empirical facts on natural resources presented in the
introduction. We can explain when natural resources are a blessing and when
they are a curse (Fact 2) and we capture the importance of the quality of
institutions and level of democracy (Fact 3). A further result of our model
is that natural resources may be bad for political turnover and will be so in
countries with little democracy / worse institutions (Fact 4). In those coun-
tries natural resources strengthen the position of the incumbent government,
who typically chooses policies which do not enhance, or are even detrimental,
to human capital accumulation and therefore growth. If the majority of coun-
tries with natural resources have bad institutions we can expect that natural
resources are bad for growth on average (Fact 1: the curse). Our model also
answers the question of when do natural resources lead to a revolution: in
countries with little democracy and bad institutions (Fact 5).
Our model links natural resources to education which is an established
engine for growth. Nevertheless, we want to be sure that the empirical facts
which are stated in terms of growth are also valid if we use education. We
therefore tested these facts for education in a series of regressions, and we
find that they indeed hold.
Some authors have suggested that the size of a country matters for the
effect of natural resources. This is captured in our model, where country
size is measured by n. Increasing n has the same effect as decreasing natural
resources W .
In our model, the income of the government stems only from natural re-
sources. In a more complete model the government can also receive income
by taxing productive activity. This is one of the extensions we would like
to study in the future. The existence of productive activity has an effect
on the incentives of politicians to encourage human capital accumulation:
better education should enhance productive activity, which in turn enables
the government to extract more taxes. But better education also strengthens
the opposition and the ability of citizens to engage in a successful revolution.
We expect that the incumbent government will prefer not to enhance educa-
tion, since education weakens its political position and it is easier for them
to increase their income from natural resources than by taxing productive
the population. This part of the population would probably go to great lengths in order
to avoid the zero capital tax.
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activity. Natural resources are easily appropriated by corrupt politicians. So
are some unnatural resources, like foreign aid. Is there a link between natural
resources and foreign aid? Can our model make predictions about the effects
foreign aid might have on education or growth?
The answer is yes. Once the foreign aid is granted it is very difficult for
international institutions to avoid that politicians steal foreign aid. Empirical
evidence suggests that only a small percentage of the aid actually reaches its
desired objective. In Uganda only 13% of foreign aid granted for education in
1991-1995 actually reached primary schools (Reinikka and Svensson (2004).
The evidence for other African countries is similar. As with natural resources
the quality of institutions is crucial in limiting stealing from foreign aid.
But similarly to natural resources, foreign aid tends to be detrimental to
democracy: studying 108 recipient countries of foreign aid in the period 1960
to 1999 Djankov, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) find a negative effect
of foreign aid on democracy which is much bigger than the negative effect of
natural resources. Like natural resources foreign aid can be the cause of civil
war and revolution.22
Given these empirical similarities between the effects of natural resources
and foreign aid, we can use our model to make predictions about when foreign
aid is a blessing and when it is a curse. In democratic countries with good
institutions, foreign aid will enhance growth, while the opposite will happen
in countries with bad institutions and little democracy. Typically it is the
latter group of countries that receives foreign aid. Our model recommends
that only poor countries that are democratic and have good institutions
should be granted foreign aid.
22Maren (1997) provides evidence that the cause of the civil war in Somalia was the
control over foreign aid.
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A Appendix
A.1 If the Fringe cannot win the election
If G wins the election with probability 1, it only has to take the no-revolution
constraint into account. Therefore, G’s problem is as follows:
max
e,w
W/n− w − λe+ αkeα+β
subject to U(w + keα+β − αkeα+β) ≥ U(γ(e)W/n− λe)− c
q
Assume now that U(x) = ln(x).
Then
max
e,w
W/n− w − λe+ αkeα+β
subject to w + keα+β − αkeα+β ≥ (γ(e)W/n− λe) exp
(
−c
q
)
Thus an equivalent way of writing the problem is:
max
e,w
W/n
(
1− γ(e) exp
(
−c
q
))
+ keα+β − λe
(
1− exp
(
−c
q
))
The FOC in this case are:
G′(e) ≡ −W/n
(
γ′(e) exp
(
−c
q
))
+k(α+β)eα+β−1−λ
(
1− exp
(
−c
q
))
= 0
∂e
∂W/n
=
γ′(e) exp
(
− c
q
)
G′′(e)
G′′(e) = −W/n
(
γ′′(e) exp
(
−c
q
))
+ k(α+ β − 1)(α+ β)eα+β−2
As before, G′′(e) ≤ 0 in the optimum, which implies that ∂e
∂W/n
≤ 0.
This assumes that we have an interior solution. A sufficient condition for
this is, γ′′(ê) ≥ 0 for ê with G′(ê) = 0.
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Figure 3: Impact of λ on wG and NR(eG)
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Figure 4: Impact of α on wG and NR(eG)
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Figure 5: Impact of A on wG and NR(eG)
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Figure 6: Impact of W/n on probability to win elections by incumbent.
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